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AMERICA OFF-LINE:
A LOOK AT THE APPLICABILITY OF
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
ON STREAMING DIGITAL MEDIA
AND THE INTERNET
SEAN POPE *
In 2012, the National Association for the Deaf brought suit against
Netflix for violating the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by not
captioning their streaming on-demand video content. The National
Association for the Deaf won at the District Court level and Netflix has
since settled the case. However, this case brought to the forefront the
widening split between those Circuit Courts of Appeal which do not feel
the ADA applies to online businesses, and those Circuits which believe that
the ADA does apply to online businesses. One problem that complicates
the analysis is the distinction and applicability of the ADA between
commercial websites that also maintain brick and mortar storefronts and
interactive websites that are exclusively online. As detailed in this
Comment, the growing disparity between ADA-compliant websites and
non-compliant websites necessitates a common approach by the courts in
order to bring the Internet in line with the intent of the ADA, to give people
with disabilities the same type of access to services and goods that is
afforded everyone else.
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INTRODUCTION

“The Americans with Disabilities Act presents us all with an historic
opportunity. It signals the end to the unjustified segregation and exclusion
of persons with disabilities from the mainstream of American life.”
President George H. W. Bush, July 26, 1990
To begin, a hypothetical: Trey is a blind individual on his way to
attend a lecture series at a local private university. After his wife drives
him to campus and parks in a handicapped parking space, Trey asks for
directions from a security guard as he makes his way across campus to his
business school. The lecture is on the fourth floor of the building, so Trey
heads to the elevators, led by his guide dog. As he gets in, he feels the
Braille lettering next to each floor to ensure that he is pushing the right
number. Upon arrival to his floor, he once again asks for assistance to find
the appropriate classroom and then settles into his seat, his guide dog lying
down on the floor next to him.
All of these benefits — the Braille lettering, the handicapped parking
spaces, and the guide dog accessibility — are available to Trey as a result
of the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990 (“ADA”). 1
However, at the time the ADA was envisioned, the Internet was not as
ubiquitous as it is now. Let’s take Trey again, but instead of attending the
lecture at his local private university, he enrolls in a class at an online
university. This university does not have a physical campus, only an office
to support its online operations. It independently contracts professors who
teach courses from their homes. Students attend classes from wherever
they have access to a computer. Would this university have to comply with
ADA regulations, such as making the website accessible to screen-reading
technology and captioning the video that it displays on the website within
the class modules? The answer depends on the Circuit in which a potential
lawsuit is initiated. Although it would be a case of first impression for any
court in the United States, other cases involving ADA compliance with
exclusively online businesses have not fared well. 2 The possibility that a
physical university would be treated differently than an online university in
terms of compliance with the ADA is at odds with the bill’s congressional
1. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012) (describing the findings and purpose of the Americans
with Disabilities Act).
2. See Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (noting that
the Ninth Circuit has not given “a place of public accommodation” a more expansive meaning).
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intent, namely, “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 3 As
the Internet has become such a large part of most Americans’ lives, the
assertion that the ADA was passed to “address the major areas of
discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities” in the physical
world alone can no longer stand. 4
This Comment will first summarize the current ADA jurisprudence
and decisions, especially pertaining to Title III, through a case study of the
recent decision of National Association of the Deaf vs. Netflix. 5 Next, it
will examine the Circuit split that has resulted in two different readings and
applications of the “public accommodations” language of Title III. 6
Finally, it proposes a new reading and interpretation of the current standard
of public accommodations in order to meet the current challenges facing
the disabled now and in an increasingly Internet-based world. The
dichotomy between traditional, physical businesses, and exclusively online
businesses must be remedied to bring both under the purview of the ADA
and to ensure that this historic legislation continues to “provide clear,
strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against
individuals with disabilities.” 7
II.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ADA AND TITLE III

The ADA was the result of two years of congressional wrangling,
which ended with the comprehensive civil rights bill passing both Houses
of Congress in overwhelming fashion in 1990. 8 Title III of the ADA
focuses on the definition of public accommodations 9 and states that, “[n]o
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (emphasis added).
5. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196 (D. Mass. 2012).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A)-(L) (2012).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2).
8. Sara D. Watson, A Study in Legislative Strategy: The Passage of the ADA, in
IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF
ALL AMERICANS 25, 25 (Lawrence O. Gostin & Henry A. Beyer eds., 1993).
9. Jeffrey S. Ranen, Note, Was Blind But Now I See: The Argument for ADA Applicability
to the Internet, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 389, 394 (2002).
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individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by
any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation.” 10 This was a pioneering triumph and a leap forward for
disabled Americans who had long suffered from inadequate
accommodations. 11
However, the basic foundations of Title III trace their origin back to
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which states that, “[a]ll persons
shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of
public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or
segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.” 12
Title III thus extended many of the same rights that were afforded to those
who were discriminated against because of race to those who face
discrimination due to disability, such as the physically handicapped.13 For
example, Title III’s definition for a place of lodging as a place of public
accommodation is almost identical to the Civil Rights Act’s definition. 14 In
fact, three of the four specific categories of public accommodations
codified in the Civil Rights Act are replicated in Title III’s public
accommodations list.15 However, Title III of the ADA was written to be
10. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2012).
11. Faye Kuo, Comment, Open and Closed: Captioning Technology as a Means to
Equality, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 159, 161-163 (2004); see also H.R. REP. NO.
101-485, pt. 3, at 23-26 (1990).
12. Wendy E. Parmet, Title III—Public Accommodations, in IMPLEMENTING THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL AMERICANS 123,
123 (Lawrence O. Gostin & Henry A. Beyer eds., 1993); 42 U.S.C.A § 2000a (2012).
13. Id. at 123-24.
14. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A) (2012) (“an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of
lodging, except for an establishment located within a building that contains not more than five
rooms for rent or hire and that is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as the
residence of such proprietor”), with 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b)(1) (2012) (“any inn, hotel, motel, or
other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests, other than an establishment
located within a building which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is
actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence.”).
15. Compare 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b)(2) (“any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch
counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on
the premises”), with 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(B) (2012) (“a restaurant, bar, or other establishment
serving food or drink”). Compare 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b)(3) (“any motion picture house,
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much more encompassing than the earlier Civil Rights Act, which “only
applied to a select number of facilities, many of which were traditionally
regulated for public benefit under common law.” 16 Congress’s intent
behind the ADA was to remove impediments and encompass almost all
aspects of public life. 17 In order to accomplish this, Congress wrote Title
III to include twelve broad categories of public accommodations, in
contrast to the Civil Rights Act’s four categories. 18 In fact, Title III went
even further with a provision embodying all “commercial facilities,” which
meant facilities “that are intended for nonresidential use; and whose
operations will affect commerce.” 19 In effect, Title III covers essentially all
entities in the physical public sphere, whereas its predecessor, the Civil
Rights Act, was tailored to only incorporate a small number of entities. 20
The Department of Justice has stated that, “the ADA mandate for ‘full
and equal enjoyment’ requires nondiscrimination by a place of public
accommodation in the offering of all its goods and services, including those
offered via Web sites,” but no formal rulemaking has been promulgated by
any federal agency that would require online businesses and websites be
ADA compliant.21

theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment”), with 42
U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C) (“a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of
exhibition or entertainment.”).
16. Parmet, supra note 13, at 123; 42 U.S.C.A § 2000a.
17. Hayley M. Koteen, Note, Ending the Disconnect for the Deaf Community: How
Amendments to the Federal Regulations Can Realign the ADA with Its Purpose, 29 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 425, 431 (2011); see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 22-23 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304 (“The purpose of the ADA is to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate to end discrimination against individuals with disabilities and to
bring persons with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of American life.”).
18. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A)-(L), with 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b)(1)-(4) (2012).
19. Wendy E. Parmet, Title III—Public Accommodations, in IMPLEMENTING THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL AMERICANS 123,
124 (Lawrence O. Gostin & Henry A. Beyer eds., 1993); 42 U.S.C. § 12181(2)(A)-(B) .
20. Wendy E. Parmet, Title III—Public Accommodations, in IMPLEMENTING THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL AMERICANS 123,
123 (Lawrence O. Gostin & Henry A. Beyer eds., 1993).
21. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Accessibility of Web Information and
Services of State and Local Government Entities and Public Accommodations, 75 Fed. Reg.
43,460, 463 (July 26, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pts. 35-36).
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III. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THE DEAF V. NETFLIX
The case National Association of the Deaf vs. Netflix illustrates a
typical Title III analysis, and provides an example of the problems
individuals and organizations face when bringing suits against online
businesses. 22 The case was brought by two non-profit organizations on
behalf of both deaf and hearing-impaired individuals 23 in connection with
the “Watch Instantly” service offered by Netflix.24 “Watch Instantly”
allows Netflix subscribers to stream thousands of movies and TV shows
directly onto their computers, phones, or any other Internet-enabled
devices. 25 However, the plaintiffs alleged that only a small portion of
Netflix’s “Watch Instantly” library contained closed captioning. 26 Closed
captioning provides for captioned text that is activated while watching
television, which “allows deaf and hard of hearing individuals to view
television shows and movies by reading” these captions. 27 “[B]y failing to
provide closed captioning on most of its ‘Watch Instantly’” titles, the
plaintiffs argued that Netflix was denying equal access to viewing for the
deaf and hard of hearing. 28 Based on the lack of universal closed
captioning, the plaintiffs brought a claim under Article III of the ADA
alleging that Netflix’s failure to caption the entirety of its library was a
form of disability discrimination.29

22. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 196 (D. Mass. 2012).
23. Id. at 199.
24. See generally How Does Netflix Work?, NETFLIX.COM, https://help.netflix.com/en
/node/412 (last visited April 19, 2014).
25. Id.
26. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 199.
27. Id.
28. Federal District Court in Massachusetts First in Country to Hold That the Americans
With Disabilities Act Applies to Website-Only Businesses, NATIONAL ASS’N OF THE DEAF (June
19, 2012, 8:25 PM), http://www.nad.org/news/2012/6/landmark‐ precedent‐ nad‐ vs‐ netflix.
29. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d, at 199. The claim was brought specifically
under 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2012), which states in pertinent part, “[n]o individual shall be
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation.”
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Defendant Netflix responded with a motion to dismiss on the basis
that when Congress passed the Twenty-First Century Communications and
Video Accessibility Act of 2010 (“CVAA”), it gave the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) primary jurisdiction over
regulation of closed captioning by businesses that offered streaming
video. 30 Netflix filed for a judgment on the pleadings based on four main
arguments. 31 First, it alleged that the plaintiffs had not successfully pled
that Netflix was a “place of public accommodation,” a necessary
component of any action claiming noncompliance with the ADA.32
Second, it argued that the plaintiffs had not successfully alleged that
Netflix had control over the captioning, another necessary component of
the action. 33 Third, it argued that the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the ADA
was precluded by Congress’ subsequent passage of the CVAA, which gave
primary jurisdiction over closed captioning in streaming video to the
FCC. 34 Finally, Netflix alleged that the plaintiffs’ claim was moot because
the FCC had already promulgated regulations about closed captioning on
the Internet. 35 The District Court of Massachusetts addressed each of these
claims in their opinion before finding for the plaintiffs. 36
A. Place of Public Accommodation
In order to state a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that the
discrimination occurred at or involved the services of a place of public
accommodation. 37 Section 12181(7) of the ADA lists twelve categories of
private entities that are considered “public accommodations” for purposes

30. Id.
31. Id. at 199-200.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 200.
34. Id.
35. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 200, 204.
36. Id. at 208.
37. See id. at 200.
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of the ADA. 38 The plaintiffs in National Association for the Deaf
maintained that Netflix’s “Watch Instantly” service fell within the scope of
at least four of the categories: “place of exhibition and entertainment,”39
“place of . . . recreation,” 40 “sales or rental establishment,” 41 and “service
establishment.” 42 The plaintiffs analogized that Netflix’s streaming service
was the same as any physical video rental store or movie theater, and ought
to be held to the same standards under the ADA. 43 They relied on the First
Circuit’s holding in Carparts Distribution Center v. Auto Wholesaler’s
Association, that a business must comply to ADA standards even if it does
not have a physical location.44 Netflix argued that Carparts was not
relevant because it dealt with an entity that conducted its business over the
phone and by mail, while the “Watch Instantly” feature was exclusively
web-based. 45 Netflix also contended that 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7), which
defines the twelve categories of places of public accommodations, does not
specifically address online business, and thus the ADA was an inapplicable
basis for a cause of action in that situation.46
The court swiftly denied all of Netflix’s contentions by reasoning that
Congress intended for the ADA to grow and adapt to the times. 47 It
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2012).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C) (stating “a motion picture house, theater, concert hall,
stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment.”).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L) (stating “a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf
course, or other place of exercise or recreation.”).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E) (stating “a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware
store, shopping center, or other sales or rental establishment.”).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (stating “a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop,
beauty shop, travel service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant
or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or
other service establishment”); Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 196, 200.
43. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 200.
44. Id. (citing Carparts Distrib. Ctr. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Assoc., 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir.
1994)).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 200-01.
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explained that the ADA made no mention of online businesses because
those types of businesses were simply inconceivable at the time of the
ADA’s passage in 1990. 48 The court noted that the twelve categories of
public accommodations were purposefully left open-ended after a few
general examples so that it could keep pace with the changing times. 49
Netflix finally asserted that because the “Watch Instantly” service is
accessed and viewed in private homes and not in public, the website could
not be a place of public accommodation. 50 In support if its position,
Netflix reasoned that the principle of ejusdem generis 51 applies to the
twelve categories of public accommodations, in that all of the listed places
are only accessible outside of the home. 52 The court found this line of
reasoning unpersuasive and stated that, “[t]he ADA covers the services ‘of’
a public accommodation, not services ‘at’ or ‘in’ a public
accommodation.” 53 It followed the reasoning in Carparts and held that if
the ADA applies to businesses that provide their products over the phone
and via mail, then Netflix, which offers services over the Internet, should
be bound by the ADA as well. 54
B. Control
In addition to showing that the discrimination occurred at or involved
the services of a place of public accommodation, “a plaintiff must also
show that a defendant ‘owns, leases (or leases to), or operates’ a place of
public accommodation.” 55 The relevant standard developed though ADA
48. Id.
49. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 200-01.
50. Id. at 201.
51. Id. (citing United States v. McKelvey, 203 F.3d 66, 71 (1st Cir. 2000) and noting that
the principle of ejusdem generis provides that “where general words…follow the enumeration of
particular classes of things…, the general words will be construed as applying only to things of
the same general class as those enumerated . . . .”).
52. Id.
53. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2012)).
54. Id. at 201-02.
55. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 202 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)).
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jurisprudence is whether the defendant “specifically controls the
modification of the [things at issue] to improve their accessibility to the
disabled.” 56 Netflix claimed that the company did not hold the copyrights
to the content on its site, and that only the copyright holders have the
exclusive ability to enable closed captioning. 57 Netflix also explained that
in order to caption the content contained in its “Watch Instantly” library, it
would have to get permission from the owners of each video, movie, or
television show that it streams. 58
The court quickly dispatched this argument by stating that Netflix was
a “Watch Instantly” website and service, therefore making it an “owner”
and “operator” of a place of public accommodation for the purposes of the
ADA. 59
C. The CVAA
Netflix’s next argument was that the passage of the CVAA supplanted
the ADA because Congress subsequently passed it to deal with a handful of
online-based activities. 60 By removing captioning of streaming video from
the purview of the ADA, the CVAA became the final word on the subject,
and any right of action for relief had to be established by the FCC. 61 The
CVAA thus created an exception for streaming video captioning from the
larger, more general disability discrimination because, “[w]hen one statute
speaks in general terms while the other is specific, conflicting provisions
may be reconciled by carving out an exception from the more general
enactment for the more specific statute.” 62 Netflix alleged that under the
CVAA and the subsequent rule promulgated by the FCC, the owners of the
copyrighted video programming were responsible for captioning, not the
Accordingly, as a distributor, it did not have the
distributor. 63
56. Id. (quoting Neff v. Am. Dairy Queen Corp., 58 F.3d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir. 1995)).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)).
60. Id. at 203.
61. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 203.
62. Id. (citing Stewart v. Smith, 673 F.2d 485, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
63. Id. at 204; see also 47 C.F.R. § 79.4(c)(1) (2012) (stating “[e]ach video programming
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responsibility under the CVAA to provide closed captioning, even if it
would have under the ADA. 64 Under the CVAA, Netflix explained that its
only obligation was to provide the rendering of the captioning to anyone
accessing its “Watch Instantly” service. 65
The court reasoned that even if Netflix had a duty under the ADA to
provide captioning for their library of “Watch Instantly” programming, it
would not be in direct conflict with any provision of the CVAA. 66 Indeed,
the court also pointed out that the CVAA’s requirement that video owners
supply the captioning would make it easier for Netflix and other video
distributors to comply with their ADA duties. 67
Netflix also alleged that the CVAA barred any private right of action,
and established an administrative complaint process that the plaintiffs were
attempting to circumvent. 68 However, the court reasoned that the CVAA’s
predecessor, the Telecommunications Act of 1996, allowed for separate
administrative and judicial routes in order to remedy conflicts.69 The court
went on to state, “[t]here is no indication that the CVAA, unlike the
Telecommunications Act, extinguishes private rights of action under the
ADA for closed captioning of video programming on the Internet.”70
Finally, Netflix argued that the CVAA permits the FCC to grant full
owner must: (i) Send program files to video programming distributors and providers with
captions as required by this section, with at least the same quality as the television captions
provided for the same programming . . . .”).
64. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 204.
65. See id. at 203-06; see also 47 C.F.R. § 79.4(c)(1)(i)-(ii).
66. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 204.
67. Id.
68. Id.; see 47 U.S.C. § 79.4(e)-(f) (stating “(e) Complaint procedures. (1) Complaints
concerning an alleged violation of the closed captioning requirements of this section shall be filed
in writing with the Commission or with the video programming distributor or provider
responsible for enabling the rendering or pass through of the closed captions for the video
programming within sixty (60) days after the date the complainant experienced a problem with
captioning . . . (f) Private rights of action prohibited. Nothing in this section shall be construed to
authorize any private right of action to enforce any requirement of this section. The Commission
shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to any complaint under this section”).
69. Id. at 204-05; see also Zulauf v. Kentucky Educ. Television, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1022,
1023-24 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
70. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 205.
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or partial exemptions from the captioning requirement if an economic
burden can be shown and that the plaintiffs were seeking to have them held
liable under the ADA without considering these very exceptions.71 The
court stated that the ADA also contains an economic burden exception, but
declined to conduct the analysis.72
In its decision, the court found that the CVAA overlapped the ADA
and that it imposed some different requirements on video programming
distributors. 73 However, there was nothing inherently contradictory
between the two statutes that would prevent them from being given effect
together. 74
The court next looked at the scope of the CVAA to see if it covered
the entirety of the Netflix “Watch Instantly” service. 75 Netflix, in a narrow
reading of the CVAA, argued that the CVAA only applied to programming
that is shown: (1) on television, (2) with closed captioning, (3) after the
date of the FCC rule promulgation. 76 It also stated that the FCC made a
choice to include only certain types of video programming under the

71. Id.; see 47 C.F.R. § 79.4(d) (stating “(1) A video programming provider or owner
may petition the Commission for a full or partial exemption from the closed captioning
requirements of this section, which the Commission may grant upon a finding that the
requirements would be economically burdensome . . . (2) . . . The Commission will consider the
following factors when determining whether the requirements for closed captioning of Internet
protocol-delivered video programming would be economically burdensome: (i) The nature and
cost of the closed captions for the programming; (ii) The impact on the operation of the video
programming provider or owner; (iii) The financial resources of the video programming provider
or owner; and (iv) The type of operations of the video programming provider or owner.”).
72. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 205; see 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii)
(2012) (stating “[discrimination includes the following], unless the entity can demonstrate that
taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege,
advantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden . . . .”).
73. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 205.
74. Id. (citing Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992)) (“Redundancies across
statutes are not unusual events in drafting, and so long as there is no ‘positive repugnancy
between two laws . . . a court must give effect to both.” (internal citation omitted)).
75. See id. at 206.
76. Id. See also 47 C.F.R. § 79.4(b) (“All nonexempt full length video programming [47
U.S.C. § 79.4(a)(2): “Full-length video programming. Video programming that appears on
television and is distributed to end users, substantially in its entirety, via Internet protocol . . . .”]
delivered using Internet protocol must be provided with closed captions if the programming is
published or exhibited on television in the United States with captions on or after the following
dates . . . .)”
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CVAA. 77 The court held that although the CVAA only covered limited
types of streaming video programming, Congress did not intend to limit the
ADA in such a way as to leave the plaintiffs in this case without a remedy,
and declined to allow the CVAA to limit the ADA in this situation. 78
D. Mootness
Netflix’s last argument was that since the FCC had already
promulgated regulations defining the responsibilities of distributors of
Internet streaming video, the plaintiffs could no longer bring an action. 79
The court soundly rejected this because the CVAA did not cover all of the
programming that the plaintiffs were alleging was in violation of the ADA,
and because the CVAA did not carve out exceptions to the ADA. 80 The
court further reiterated that because the plaintiffs had brought the action
under the ADA, whether or not the FCC regulations had already gone into
effect was immaterial to the outcome of the case. 81
IV. CIRCUIT SPLIT ON “PLACE OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION”
The holding in Netflix was based in part on previous rulings that were
binding upon the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts as part of the First Circuit.82 The case hinged on a reading
of “place of public accommodation” as interpreted by the First Circuit in
Carparts Distribution Center v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Association of
New England. 83 The Netflix court followed the reasoning in Carparts that
“places of public accommodation” are not merely limited to physical
places. 84 In a case of first impression in the First Circuit, 85 the Court found
77. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 206.
78. Id. at 207-08.
79. Id. at 208.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196, 201-02 (D. Mass. 2012).
83. Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d
12, 12 (1st Cir. 1994).
84. Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 200.
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that the plain meaning of the entities discussed under the “public
accommodations” section of Title III of the ADA, 86 such as a “travel
service” 87 or a “service establishment,” 88 was, at worst, ambiguous. 89 The
court went on to reason that the plain meaning of the terms did not require
any of these entities to have physical structures.90 It further stated:
[O]ne can easily imagine the existence of other service establishments
conducting business by mail and phone without providing facilities for
their customers to enter in order to utilize their services. It would be
irrational to conclude that persons who enter an office to purchase services
are protected by the ADA, but persons who purchase the same services
over the telephone or by mail are not. Congress could not have intended
such an absurd result. 91
This reasoning 92 has been followed by several other Circuits over the
years. 93 Chief Judge Richard Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit in
Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company, 94 cited Carparts 95 when
stating that “a place of public accommodation” could encompass a physical
or electronic space.96 The Second Circuit ruled similarly in finding that an
insurance company was meant to be included in the spirit of the plain

85. Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 19.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2012).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).
88. Id.
89. Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 19.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. That Title III of the ADA applies not only to physical places of public
accommodation, but also to non-physical locations.
93. See, e.g., Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999).
94. Id.
95. Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 12.
96. Doe, 179 F.3d at 559.
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meaning of an “insurance office.” 97 By holding that “the statute was meant
to guarantee [the disabled] more than mere physical access,” 98 the Court
further opened the door for non-physical spaces to be included within the
meaning of “public accommodations.” 99
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit tackled the “public accommodation”
issue when five plaintiffs sued the producers of “Who Wants To Be A
Millionaire.” 100 The show selected contestants by having aspiring
participants call a toll-free automated telephone number to answer a series
of trivia questions. 101 Contestants who answered all of the questions
correctly moved on to the second round.102 The plaintiffs were all either
deaf or had limited finger mobility which prevented them from registering
their answers on their telephone keypads. 103 The Court found that a plain
and unambiguous reading of the language revealed that the “public
accommodations” provision covered both “tangible barriers” and
“intangible barriers.” 104 As such, it held that Title III of the ADA applied
to the telephone selection process of contestants for “Who Wants To Be A
Millionaire.” 105
However, as the First, Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits found
that “public accommodations” covered physical and non-physical
entities, 106 other Circuits were meanwhile holding that “public
97. See Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 32-33 (2d Cir. 1999); see also 42
U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (2012) (listing “insurance office” as a place of “public accommodation.”).
98. Id. at 32.
99. Id. at 33.
100. See generally Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2002).
101. Id. at 1280.
102. Id. at 1280.
103. Id. at 1280-81.
104. Id. at 1283.
105. Id. at 1286.
106. See generally Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2002);
Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999); Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co.,
198 F.3d 28 (2nd Cir. 1999); Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New
England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994).
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accommodations” only consisted of physical locations. 107
Curiously, all four Circuits that found Title III applied only to
physical entities dealt with similar facts involving insurance. 108 The Sixth
Circuit found that Title III did not prevent an employer from providing
different benefits for employees who became disabled due to physical
illness, as opposed to those who became disabled due to mental illness.109
It defined a “public accommodation” as “a facility, operated by a private
entity, whose operations affect commerce and fall within at least one of the
twelve ‘public accommodation’ categories.” 110 In reasoning that it was not
a “public accommodation,” the court cited two Sixth Circuit cases in which
it had found that associations did not fall under the purview of Title III. 111
A dissenting opinion argued that the reasoning in favor of extending Article
III to non-physical structures, as articulated by Carparts, 112 was more in
tune with Congress’ intent. 113
The Third Circuit, in dealing with the issue, also found that disparities
in insurance benefits for mental and physical disabilities offered by
employers did not violate the ADA. 114 The court reasoned that since the
employee had received her insurance from her employer, she had no nexus
to the insurance company’s physical office. 115 In addition, the court, when
distinguishing Carparts, said that the First Circuit did not follow the
doctrine of noscitur a sociis, “[a] canon of construction holding that the
107. See generally McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 179 (5th Cir. 2000); Weyer v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000); Ford v. Schering-Plough
Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 614 (3d Cir. 1998); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th
Cir. 1997).
108. Id.
109. Parker, 121 F.3d at 1008.
110. Id. at 1011 (citing Stoutenborough v. National Football League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580,
583 (6th Cir. 1995)).
111. See McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 119 F.3d 453, 463 (6th Cir.
1997); Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011 (citing Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 64 F.3d
1026, 1036 (6th Cir. 1995)).
112. Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 19.
113. Parker, 121 F.3d at 1019-20.
114. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 601.
115. Id. at 612-13.
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meaning of an unclear word or phrase should be determined by the words
immediately surrounding it,” 116 in deciding the ambiguous nature of the
examples under “public accommodations.” 117 These terms, the Third
Circuit reasoned, “should be interpreted by reference to the accompanying
words of the statute ‘to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts
of Congress.’” 118 The court held that “public accommodations” did not
encompass non-physical entities, and that the meaning of the terms was not
ambiguous. 119
The Fifth Circuit found that although Title III prohibited owners and
lessees from preventing the disabled from being able to access a physical
place, it could not be applied to regulate the goods and services offered. 120
It reasoned that, “in many, if not most, cases, the disabled simply will not
have the capacity or ability to enjoy the goods and services of an
establishment ‘fully’ and ‘equally’ compared to the non-disabled.” 121 It
inferred that some goods and services are inherent to the nature of the
business, such as a movie theater or a tennis arena. 122 The court reasoned
that a blind individual may enjoy attending tennis matches, but it would be
impossible to rectify the situation through the ADA where the blind person
would be able to have the same experience as someone with their sight. 123
To go against this logic, “[r]estaurants would have to limit their menus to
avoid discriminating against diabetics.” 124 The court argued that Title III
had to be interpreted and construed with functional and practical
boundaries. 125 In doing this, it explained it had to prevent Title III from
116. Noscitur a sociis is Latin for “it is known by its associates.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1160-61 (9th ed. 2009).
117. Ford, 145 F.3d at 614.
118. Id. (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)).
119. Id.
120. McNeil, 205 F.3d at 186.
121. Id. at 187
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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being applied to all goods and services, as there was no non-arbitrary way
to distinguish goods that ought to be protected from goods that ought not to
be protected. 126 The “good” being offered there was insurance, which is
not protected under the “public accommodations” statute because the Fifth
Circuit held that the owner of a place of public accommodation did not
need to modify its goods and services in order to avoid a Title III
violation. 127
Finally, the Ninth Circuit ruled that Title III only covered physical
locations. 128 Following the Sixth 129 and Third 130 decisions, the court first
determined that the principle of noscitur a sociis required that “public
accommodation” be interpreted within the context of all of its qualifying
words. 131 After looking at all twelve categories of establishments under
“public accommodation,” 132 the court found that, “some connection
between the good or service complained of and an actual physical place is
required.” 133 As in all previous cases in which the various Circuits found
that Title III did not apply to insurance companies,134 the Ninth Circuit
could not find a nexus between the benefit plan offered by an employer and
a good offered by a place of public accommodation.135
The Third, 136 Sixth, 137 and Ninth 138 Circuit decisions all dealt with
126. McNeil, 205 F.3d at 187.
127. Id. at 188.
128. Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1115.
129. Parker, 121 F.3d at 1014 (“To interpret these terms [of §12181(7) and subsection
(F)] as permitting a place of accommodation to constitute something other than a physical place is
to ignore the text of the statute and the principle of nonscitur a sociis.”).
130. Ford, 145 F.3d at 614 (“Pursuant to the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the terms that
the First Circuit finds ambiguous should be interpreted by reference to the accompanying words
of the statute ‘to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.’”).
131. Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1114.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A)-(L) (2012).
133. Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1114.
134. See McNeil,, 205 F.3d at 182; Ford, 145 F.3d at 612-13; Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011.
135. Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1114-15.
136. Ford, 145 F.3d at 612-13.
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insurance companies administering an employer-provided disability policy.
All three found that the policy was not a place of “public
This directly contrasts the First,140 Second, 141
accommodation.” 139
142
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits’ 143 findings that Title III was implicated
by discrimination that might have occurred in non-physical locations. The
facts of seven of the eight cases were remarkably similar in that they dealt
with insurance companies.144 The sides favoring a conservative approach
to Title III — and finding that it did not apply to non-physical locations —
tended to conclude that the companies were insurance companies, rather
than insurance offices. 145 This is an important distinction because Title III
only specifically mentions “insurance office[s]” 146 as being “public
accommodations,” not insurance companies.147 The Circuits that found the
ADA could apply to non-physical entities 148 took the opposite approach
and found that since Title III expressly provides for “insurance
office[s],” 149 and the goods and services provided at insurance offices are
mostly insurance policies, Title III is applicable to those policies as well. 150
137. Parker, 121 F.3d at 1010.
138. Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1114-15.
139. See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1010-11; Ford, 145 F.3d at 614; Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1115.
140. Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 19.
141. Pallozzi, 198 F.3d at 32-33.
142. Doe, 179 F.3d at 559.
143. Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1286.
144. The only one of the eight that did not deal with an insurance claim was Rendon, 294
F.3d 1279, which dealt with contestant screening for Who Wants To Be A Millionaire.
145. See, e.g., Parker, 121 F.3d at 1010.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (2012).
147. Id. § 12181(7).
148. See Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d at 20; Doe, 179 F.3d at 559; Pallozzi, 198
F.3d at 33.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).
150. Pallozzi, 198 F.3d at 31.
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The Department of Justice has made it extremely clear that websites
are considered “public accommodations” under Title III. 151 The thrust of
the Department of Justice’s argument is that Title III must be applicable to
any activity or service offered by a “public accommodation” whether it is
on or off site. 152 This would appear to be out of line with the four Circuit
Courts that have decided that Title III is only applicable to physical
locations. 153 The issue of Title III and its applicability to the Internet is one
that Circuits have not had to grapple with much. But based on the current
Circuit divide between physical and non-physical locations, it will only be
a matter of time before this issue is granted certiorari by the Supreme Court
to clear up the division.
V. SOCIAL MEDIA AND STREAMING CONTENT: THE NEXT HORIZON
A. The Target and Facebook Cases
On Oct. 10, 2012, Netflix entered into a joint consent decree with the
National Association for the Deaf. 154 As part of the decree, Netflix pledged
to have closed captioning on 100% of its streaming video library within the
next two years. 155 In addition, Netflix would seek to ensure that captioning
would be available not only on computers, but also on devices that can
access the streaming content.156 This would seem to include the growing
popularity of smartphones and tablet computers.
Netflix and other streaming video providers like Hulu are joining the
fray of online businesses that are either voluntarily adopting these policies

151. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Accessibility of Web Information and
Services of State and Local Government Entities and Public Accommodations, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,
460 (July 26, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 and 36).
152. Id. at 464.
153. See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1010-11; Ford, 145 F.3d at 612; McNeil, 205 F.3d at 186;
Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1114.
154. Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf, Netflix and Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf Reach
Historic Agreement to Provide 100% Closed Captions in On-Demand Streaming Content Within
Two Years (Oct. 10, 2012) (on file with author).
155. See id.
156. See id.
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or are being forced to conform to the ADA. 157 However, lawsuits alleging
noncompliance with the ADA against social media sites such as Facebook
have not fared well for disability rights groups.158 There is a growing
divide between online businesses that have adopted or are being forced to
adopt the ADA provisions and those online businesses which have not.159
This divide is most apparent between commercial sites, which tend to be
supported by a brick and mortar business, and interactive sites, which tend
to be exclusively online. In National Federation of the Blind v. Target
Corporation, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California found that any aspect of Target.com which offered information
and services about the physical location of stores and their offerings for
sale had to be compliant with Title III, the failure of which would “impair a
disabled person’s ‘full enjoyment’ of services or goods of a covered
accommodation.” 160 However, the court also found that any part of
Target.com that offered information and services that were unconnected to
any physical Target store did not fall within the purview of Title III. 161 The
court thus required a nexus between the online services and the physical
public accommodation in order to state a claim under Title III. 162
Five years later, the same court was asked whether the social
networking site, Facebook, had violated Title III. 163 In Young v. Facebook,
Inc., a young woman’s profile was deactivated for “behavior identified as
potentially harassing or threatening to other Facebook users.” 164 The
woman, alleging that she suffered from bipolar disorder, filed suit against
Facebook for unlawful discrimination by failing to provide reasonable
157. See, e.g., id.; Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 950
(N.D. Cal. 2006).
158. See Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115-16 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
159. Compare Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 955, with Young, 790 F. Supp.
2d at 1115.
160. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 954 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)
(2012)).
161. Id. at 956.
162. Id. at 954.
163. See Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1113.
164. Id. at 1114.
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customer services to individuals suffering from mental disabilities.165 The
woman, rather than showing that Facebook was a place of public
accommodation within the meaning of the ADA, instead relied on Carparts
and Doe 166 to show that other Circuits had found that public
accommodations encompassed more than physical structures and
buildings. 167 However, the court stated that it was bound to follow Ninth
Circuit precedent, which has not expanded the meaning of “place of public
accommodation” to include more than physical structures and the services
that encompass them. 168
The plaintiff also alleged that Facebook’s services met the Target
nexus test as a physical place of public accommodation because it sold its
own branded gift cards in stores all over the United States. 169 In return,
“the alleged discrimination on Facebook’s website deprive[d] her of full
and equal access to the goods and services provided by Facebook through
physical retail stores.” 170 However, the court, in a strict reading of Title III,
found that since Facebook does not “own, lease . . . or operate,” the stores
where its gift cards are sold, its Internet services did not have a nexus to a
physical place of public accommodation. 171
B. The Explosion of Social Media
The skyrocketing use of social media websites such as Facebook,
Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, and Pinterest requires Congress to reexamine
the ADA to bring these online businesses into compliance with the ADA
165. See id. at 1114-15.
166. Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc., 37 F.3d 12; Doe, 179 F.3d 557.
167. Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1115; See Carparts Distrib. Ctr. Inc., 37 F.3d at 19; see
also Doe, 179 F.3d at 559.
168. Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1115.
169. See id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1116 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2012)) (“No individual shall be
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to) or operates a place of public
accommodation.”) (emphasis added).
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by amending its public accommodations language to include non-physical
businesses. 172 If Congress decides not to act, courts can and must insert
themselves into the conversation by stating unequivocally that online
businesses fall within the purview of the ADA. In general, the ADA
prohibits
discrimination
against
individuals
enjoying
public
accommodations, such that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against
on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place
of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or
operates a place of public accommodation.” 173 Importantly here, the
language “operates” could be interpreted to mean that online businesses
that have no nexus to physical businesses (such as Facebook) operate
places of public accommodation. Such a finding, however, would still
have to be based on one of the categories of public accommodations. The
statute states:
The following private entities are considered public
accommodations for purposes of this subchapter, if the
operations of such entities affect commerce—
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except
for an establishment located within a building that contains
not more than five rooms for rent or hire and that is
actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment
as the residence of such proprietor;
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food
or drink;
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium,
or other place of exhibition or entertainment;
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other
place of public gathering;
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store,
shopping center, or other sales or rental establishment;
172. A recent estimate found that Facebook had 955 million users, Twitter had 500
million users, LinkedIn had 174 million users, Instagram had 40 million users, and Pinterest had
16.8 million users. Samantha Felix, CHARTS: See How Massive Social Media Is Now, By Users
And Dollars, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-bigsocial-media-has-become-2012-9.
173. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (emphasis added).
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(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty
shop, travel service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas
station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy,
insurance office, professional office of a health care
provider, hospital, or other service establishment;
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified
public transportation;
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public
display or collection;
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of
recreation;
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or
postgraduate private school, or other place of education;
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless
shelter, food bank, adoption agency, or other social service
center establishment; and
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or
other place of exercise or recreation.174
A suit against a business such as Facebook could proceed under
section (D) as a category of online business. 175 Many people sign up for a
Facebook account in order to gather and discuss events, stories, pictures,
and memories of events that are relevant or important to them. 176 It would
be reasonable to view social media as a place of public gathering. 177 Even
the online university discussed in the introductory hypothetical could fall
under subsection (J)’s inclusion of all places of education. 178 The
challenge in all of these cases would be to overcome the initial hurdle of
establishing that an exclusively online business, with no connection or
nexus to a physical business location, could be classified as a place of

174. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A)-(L) (2012).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(D).
176. For example, the New York Giants’ official fan page on Facebook has over 3.1
million likes, with each post garnering hundreds of comments and thousands of likes. New York
Giants, http://www.facebook.com/newyorkgiants?fref=ts (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
177. See Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1115.
178. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(J).
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public accommodation. 179
In order to prevail on a Title III discrimination claim, “[a] plaintiff
must show that: (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the
defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public
accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied public accommodations
by the defendant because of her disability.” 180 By categorizing online
social media businesses as places of public accommodation, Title III claims
could be brought against them. 181 One big worry of those advocating
against such an expansive view of the ADA is a flood of Title III lawsuits
burying online businesses in tsunamis of litigation.182 However, when
private individuals bring a claim against places of public accommodation,
they may only seek injunctive relief 183 and reasonable attorney’s fees and
costs. 184 This should prevent most, if not all, frivolous and irrelevant
lawsuits because the people that are going to sue businesses like Facebook
and Twitter are going to be people with disabilities. They only want to be
able to have full access and enjoyment of these sites – not to be awarded
massive damages. Only by interpreting public accommodations to include
these exclusively online businesses will courts be able to once again satisfy
the original purpose of the ADA. 185
Another important consideration for implementing these changes,
whether by the courts or by Congress, is the costs that online businesses
would incur in order to make their websites accessible. 186 Title III already
179. See Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1115.
180. Id. (citing Ariz. ex. rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enters., 603 F.3d 666, 670
(9th Cir. 2010)).
181. See id.
182. See generally Faye Kuo, Comment, Open and Closed: Captioning Technology as a
Means to Equality, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 159, 203 (2004).
183. Basically ordering the public accommodation to bring the entity within ADA
compliance.
184. Questions and Answers: The Americans with Disabilities Act and Persons with
HIV/AIDS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, http://www.ada.gov/aids/ada_q&a_aids.htm#public-accm
(last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
185. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)–(4) (2012).
186. Hayley M. Koteen, Note, Ending the Disconnect for the Deaf Community: How
Amendments to the Federal Regulations Can Realign the ADA with Its Purpose, 29 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 425, 448 (2011).
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carves out an undue burden exception to Title III compliance if the public
accommodation can show that compliance would, “[f]undamentally alter
the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or
accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden.” 187
Online businesses could use this exemption if such regulations would be
too burdensome for them to comply, and would also prevent either the
courts or Congress from implementing or promulgating requirements that
would be too strict. 188 Any new requirements would have to be narrow
enough to achieve the result of online accessibility by the disabled, but not
so strict that most online businesses would rather claim that the new
regulations would be an undue burden and take their chances in court. 189
This would likely require “‘a fact-specific, case-by-case inquiry that
considers, among other factors, the effectiveness of the modification in
light of the nature of the disability in question and the cost to the
organization that would implement it.’” 190 A case-by-case basis of
individual websites may prompt fears of excessive and widespread
litigation, as was the case with movie theaters when the ADA became
law. 191 However, during the implementation of the original ADA, the
judicial system was more than able to handle these cases. 192
VI. CONCLUSION
The world is becoming more and more divided into groups of those
who have access to the Internet and those who do not. We are continually
evolving into a global society, both in business as well as in
communication and socialization. A friend living in China or Bolivia is

187. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).
188. Koteen, supra note 186, at 447-48.
189. See generally id.
190. Charles D. Mockbee IV, Note, Caught in the Web of the Internet: The Application of
the Americans with Disabilities Act to Online Businesses, 28 S. ILL. U. L.J. 553, 573 (2004),
quoting Anita Ramasastry, Should Web-Only Businesses be Required to be Disabled-Accessible?,
CNN (Nov. 7, 2002), http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LAW/11/07/findlaw.analysis.ramasastry.disab
led/index.html.
191. See generally Kuo, supra note 182, at 203.
192. See David M. Stokes, Relief for the Deaf: The Michigan Handicappers’ Civil Rights
Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 U. DET. L. REV. 513, 535 (1991).
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only a few keystrokes away. The explosive popularity of smartphones has
made online accessibility a 24-hour-per-day possibility. 193 Those who have
access to the Internet every day and use it whenever they want may take it
for granted, but universal access is far from reality, especially for those
with disabilities. Unfortunately, the ADA was not written with the
explosion of Internet usage in mind. 194 Some courts have started to rectify
this problem by finding that businesses that maintain online and physical
presences must make their sites pertaining to services available in their
physical stores ADA compliant. 195 Additionally, online businesses started
to take it upon themselves to voluntarily come within ADA compliance, as
seen in the Netflix case and subsequent consent agreement. 196 However,
there is still a significant swath of Americans who cannot enjoy free and
unfettered access to the Internet, and that is why courts need to recognize
that the Internet is as much a public accommodation as any brick and
mortar storefront. 197
There is a circuit split as to whether online businesses with physical
locations should even be viewed under the light of the ADA, with some
saying non-physical entities should be covered under the ADA, 198 and
others saying they should not. 199 However, there is also a growing
193. See generally America’s New Mobile Majority: A Look at Smartphone Owners in the
U.S., NIELSEN (May 7, 2012), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/?p=31688.
194. See Ryan C. Richards, Reconciling the Americans with Disabilities Act and
Commercial Websites: A Feasible Solution?, 7 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 520, 525 (2010).
195. See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d 946, 956 (N.D. Cal.
2006).
196. See generally Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 196 (D. Mass.
2012); Press Release, National Association of the Deaf, Netflix and the National Association of
the Deaf Reach Historic Agreement to Provide 100% Closed Captions in On-Demand Streaming
Content Within Two Years (Oct. 10, 2012) (on file with author).
197. Jeffrey S. Ranen, Note, Was Blind But Now I See: The Argument for ADA
Applicability to the Internet, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 389, 418 (2002). .
198. See Carparts Distrib. Ctr. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Assoc., 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir.
1994); Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999); Pallozzi v. Allstate
Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1999); Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279,
1283 (11th Cir. 2002).
199. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1010-11 (6th Cir. 1997);
Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 613-14 (3d Cir. 1998); McNeil v. Time Ins. Co.,
205 F.3d 179, 188 (5th Cir. 2000); Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104,
1114 (9th Cir. 2000).
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dichotomy between these commercial online businesses which have been
found to fall under the purview of the ADA, 200 and interactive online
businesses which maintain no physical presence in which they provide
goods or services, as their entire presence is online. 201 These interactive
sites so far have escaped having to become ADA complaint. In the absence
of congressional intent to change Title III, courts should begin to view
online, non-physical entities as falling under the ADA’s umbrella of public
accommodations. Courts would still be able to use discretion when
deciding whether businesses that would not have previously fallen under
the traditional “place[s] of public gathering” 202 sub-heading from having to
expend a lot of money to meet the demands of Title III. 203 The key, at least
at first, would be to give courts a high level of flexibility when dealing with
these first cases, as this would be an entirely new area of applicability for
the ADA. 204 The courts must be able to strike a balance in leveling the
playing field between disabled and nondisabled Internet users, while not
being so onerous so as to prevent most online businesses and social media
providers from being able to meet the requirements.205 In the long run, the
application of Title III to non-physical entities, especially social media and
online businesses, will benefit all of those who are disabled and cannot
access these interactive websites now. It would seek to ensure that “all
Americans will have an equal opportunity to connect with the goods,
services, communities, and opportunities proliferating online everyday.” 206
This is the logical next step in the evolution of the ADA, and the
restoration of the original goals and purposes of this historic piece of
legislation. 207 Judicial action must step up in the face of legislative
200. See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 956 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
201. See Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115-16 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
202. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(D) (2012).
203. For instance, it may be perfectly reasonable for a court to hold that a small blog read
by a few dozen people each week would not fall under a “place of public gathering.”
204. See Richards, supra note 194, at 559.
205. See id.
206. Nikki D. Kessling, Why the Target “Nexus Test” Leaves Disabled Americans
Disconnected: A Better Approach to Determine Whether Private Commercial Websites are
“Places of Public Accommodation”, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 991, 1029 (2008).
207. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2012).
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inaction, especially to protect and preserve the rights of a minority class. In
this case, making the Internet and interactive websites accessible to every
American to use and enjoy, must be of the utmost priority.

